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Abstract: The regulator-intermediary-target (RIT) framework exposes the potential for  
intermediaries to provide alternative channels for capture. In this article, I argue that the risk 
of capture can be mitigated through what I call regulatory stewardship—a novel conception of 
regulatory management that involves the intermediaries themselves monitoring the 
performance of one another. I explore regulatory stewardship by examining a new generation 
of human rights treaty innovation: the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture 
(OPCAT) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). These 
instruments differentially formalize relations among intermediaries. I use their contrasting 
experiences to identify three factors central to effective regulatory stewardship: (1) the nature 
of the task environment; (2) the quality of rule frameworks; and (3) the approaches adopted by 
potential stewards in practice. This study argues for the importance of regulatory stewardship 
within RIT arrangements, particularly where targets are strongly motivated to resist 
implementation. 
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Regulatory Stewardship and Intermediation: Lessons from Human Rights Governance 
 
The regulator-intermediary-target (RIT) framework advanced by Abbott, Levi-Faur, and 
Snidal (this volume) provides a valuable model of regulation as a three (or more)-party game, 
providing the foundations for complex accounts of regulatory processes and outcomes. For the 
purposes of this study, the framework problematizes the interests of diverse players and the 
potential for intermediation to provide alternative channels for capture. Intermediaries charged 
with acting in conjunction with a regulator to affect the behavior of a target may be particularly 
vulnerable to capture. This opens up the possibilities of both capture of the regulator through 
the intermediary (T captures R through I), and capture of the intermediary alone, where that is 
sufficient (T captures I). Regulators often lack the operational capabilities to effectively shield 
the intermediary from interference. In this article, I ague that the threat of capture in regulatory 
regimes that invole intermediation can be mitigated with what I call regulatory stewardship, a 
novel conception of capture control. 
Regulatory stewardship involves the assignment of mutual-monitoring and support 
responsibilities among intermediaries themselves, with the goal of safeguarding against capture 
and enhancing performance. It is an increasingly viable mode of governance within global 
regulatory arrangements that involve more than one intermediary. However, unlike other 
methods to control capture, such as screening, contract design, and sanctions, it has rarely been 
identified or explored in regulatory theory.1 Less narrow and contractual than delegation, but 
more formalized and purposive than experimental governance, stewardship draws on both 
hierarchy and managerialism (Hawkins et al. 2006; de Búrca 2015).  
Stewards are intermediaries themselves, who employ both instrumental and normative 
mechanisms of influence. If mutual monitoring is their primary task, stewardship also involves 
a second aspect, providing advice and assistance through a mutual-support function. 
Stewardship highlights an overlooked internal, dynamic realm of capture control that can 
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become institutionalized as intermediation practice. Such accountability innovation, aimed at 
providing additional checks within the RIT system, may be particularly important in settings 
where targets are strongly motivated to resist implementation. 
To explore this conjecture, I examine a new generation of human rights treaty 
innovation: the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT) and the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).2 Both instruments take a turn 
toward more intrusive governance architecture via intermediation, reflecting the limited 
capacity of human rights regulators (UN treaties and their state parties) to effectively bring 
pressure to bear on targets (individual states). Both also provide compelling examples of RIT 
regulation, with viable sites of regulatory stewardship apparent among international and 
nationally located intermediaries.  
State parties to human rights conventions are typically obliged to recognize the 
monitoring jurisdiction of a Geneva-based UN treaty body, comprising independent experts. 
In the CRPD, this body is the Committee for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The 
OPCAT directs state parties to recognize the jurisdiction of a Subcommittee for the Prevention 
of Torture (SPT). As explained below, these international intermediaries are good candidates 
for exercising regulatory stewardship toward national mechanisms, which the conventions 
obligate individual state parties to establish. The CRPD prescribes the designation of “one or 
more focal points” and a “national framework” as legal obligations, and also directs states to 
consider establishing an optional “coordination mechanism.”3 Parties to the OPCAT must 
designate a “national preventive mechanism” (NPM).4 These national intermediaries may in 
turn pursue a regulatory stewardship policy. 
Not all intermediaries in these two RIT systems are independent of government. The 
CRPD focal point and the (voluntary) coordination mechanism are governmental bodies, 
mandated to oversee implementation within the public administration of the state party. In 
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contrast, the CRPD national framework, subsequently termed the national monitoring 
mechanism (NMM), must include “one or more independent [from government] mechanisms,” 
tasked with the “promotion, protection and monitoring” of implementation.5 The CRPD NMM 
is the closest analogue to the OPCAT’s NPM, which similarly must be guaranteed “functional 
independence” from government. Both instruments also explicitly reference independent 
safeguards (“the Paris Principles”) for the design of national human rights institutions 
(NHRIs).6 Reflecting this standard, the majority of these bodies are NHRIs: statutory bodies 
appointed by the legislature, independent of the executive, and undertaking their mandate 
without instruction (Pegram 2015). 
The premium placed on the independence of this class of national-level intermediaries 
is complicated by the nature of their designation. The regulator in the CRPD and OPCAT 
authorizes the intermediaries’ role and requires targets to accept their regulatory jurisdiction. 
However, and crucially, both instruments provide that each state may individually designate 
its own national intermediaries, as opposed to designation by the regulator or another external 
party. In contexts where the target is strongly motivated to resist implementation, this 
introduces a high risk that the intermediary will lack independence from the target and/or the 
requisite operational capacity. Anticipating this risk, the regulator may also adopt safeguards 
that make capture difficult for the target, including rules that mandate or encourage 
intermediaries to independently monitor each other’s behavior: regulatory stewardship. 
To investigate what makes for effective stewardship, this study identifies three key 
dimensions, along which the CRPD and OPCAT vary significantly: First, the characteristics of 
the task environment, in particular, the extent to which the target is motivated to resist 
implementation. Second, the enabling quality of formal rule frameworks, especially the extent 
to which they provide intermediaries (as potential stewards) independence safeguards, as well 
as mutual-monitoring and support prerogatives. Third, the policy approaches that potential 
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stewards pursue in practice. The findings of this article have clear implications for the quality 
of regulatory outcomes in other fields, such as environment, transnational business, and health, 
which also typically display multiple intermediaries and where implementation of policy 
directives often proves problematic. 
I begin by applying the RIT model to the CRPD and OPCAT. It then introduces the 
concept of regulatory stewardship. This is followed by an examination of variation in task 
environments between disability rights and torture prevention. The study then analyzes the 
enabling design features granted to the international intermediaries established by these two 
instruments, with particular attention to monitoring and support, before assessing their 
approach toward stewardship in practice. The conclusion examines the implications of 
regulatory stewardship for the RIT model and regulatory politics more generally. 
 
An RIT Model of Human Rights Treaty Innovation 
The UN human rights regime plays a central role in agenda-setting and negotiation of human 
rights treaties. It also undertakes the hierarchical task of monitoring human rights treaty 
implementation. Notwithstanding progress on this front, a persistent compliance gap has led to 
sharp criticism. The compliance challenge underpins longstanding efforts by regulators to 
engage intermediaries in their activities. This has traditionally taken the form of international 
monitoring mechanisms. However, recent treaty innovations mark a significant departure from 
precedent. The OPCAT and the CRPD oblige state parties to recognize the monitoring 
prerogatives of not only international treaty bodies, but also domestic monitoring and 
implementation mechanisms. 
Both instruments are unique within the international treaty system in that they require 
a national mechanism to be established, as a matter of international legal obligation. Figure 1 
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illustrates this new generation of RIT architecture, highlighting the shift from a traditional 
model of international monitoring to a two-tier monitoring arrangement. 
 
FIGURE 1 
RIT Arrangement in the CRPD and OPCAT 
 
 
 
 
 
The regulator 
The regulator in this domain is the collective of state parties acting through the relevant 
UN treaty, the CRPD, and OPCAT respectively. It is important to note that the regulator in 
each instrument delegates to individual states (the targets) the task of appointing independent 
experts to the international monitoring mechanism, as well as designating the national 
intermediary. The fact that the regulator (collective state parties) and targets (individual states) 
are closely related introduces an important complication to the RIT framework. Treaties are 
binding laws intended to change the behavior of the targets: states acting individually. If the 
target approaches its regulatory duties in good faith, then absent capacity constraints, 
compliance is largely assured. However, states display a high risk of defection, as shown by 
the limited effectiveness of human rights agreements. Recognition of this credibility gap has 
motivated UN regulators to directly engage the services of international and national-level 
intermediaries as a matter of treaty law and practice. 
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UN human rights treaty bodies play a key intermediary function, tasked with defining 
the legal scope of human rights treaty obligations and monitoring compliance.7 However, these 
bodies labor under significant government constraints, traditionally exercising only indirect 
forms of watchdog oversight, their work circumscribed by consent requirements, 
confidentiality clauses, and reliance on self-reporting by states. Such constraints have driven 
them to innovate more intrusive working practices, including facilitating third-party access and 
continuous feedback through monitoring and reporting (de Búrca 2015). The OPCAT and 
CRPD mark a formalization of this recent trend. 
The OPCAT is the more intrusive instrument of the two, establishing an international 
intermediary, the SPT, which is unique among treaty bodies because it has the authority to 
conduct field visits to arrive at its own independent assessment of state compliance.8 As this 
article details, the ability of the SPT to directly access local sites of detention without prior 
authorization from governments, coupled with a range of formal monitoring and support 
functions vis-à-vis national intermediaries, provides it with a robust basis on which to pursue 
regulatory stewardship in practice. 
In the CPRD, monitoring duties at the international level are entrusted to the Committee 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The committee follows the traditional human rights 
treaty body model. It is mandated to review state reports, assess information from third parties, 
and issue general comments. The most significant difference between the committee and the 
SPT lies in the former’s inability to conduct field visits—the committee is reliant on state self-
reporting.9 The committee, like most treaty bodies, will review each state party every six to 
eight years, at most. As such, monitoring and implementation activities by national 
mechanisms assume particular importance. 
 
The domestic intermediary 
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The OPCAT and CRPD introduce a new tier of domestic intermediaries into the 
traditional treaty law paradigm, with the regulator formally delegating functions to domestic 
mechanisms. OPCAT National Preventive Mechanisms (NPM) are intended to “regularly 
examine the treatment of the persons deprived of their liberty in places of detention.”10 The 
CRPD provides for two obligatory national mechanisms: “one or more focal points within 
government for matters relating to implementation” and “a framework, including one or more 
independent mechanisms … to promote, protect and monitor implementation.”11 It also 
includes an optional “coordination mechanism within government to facilitate related action in 
different sectors.” Notably, the CRPD brings in beneficiaries as active participants, with state 
parties directed to ensure that disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs) are “involved and 
participate fully in the monitoring process” (Koenig-Archibugi and MacDonald, this volume). 
The OPCAT relies on the NPM to engage persons deprived of their liberty.  
Both instruments lay down rules to govern the structural form and activities of their 
domestic mechanisms. However, the CRPD and OPCAT differ markedly in this regard, with 
the latter providing much more detailed obligations as to intermediary form and function. The 
OPCAT obliges states to “guarantee the functional independence of the [NPMs] as well as the 
independence of their personnel.”12 In addition, NPM design is subject to required safeguards 
and powers. These include independence (functional, personnel, and institutional), monitoring 
prerogatives to examine regularly the treatment of detainees, access without prior notice to all 
places of deprivation of liberty, submission of proposals and observations on legislation, 
requests for any relevant information, enjoyment of privileges and immunities, and, 
importantly, engagement with UN bodies.13 
This precision contrasts with the brevity of the CRPD on design of the independent 
NMM: it prescribes no specific organizational form beyond reference to “one or more 
independent mechanisms.” State parties are instead directed “to take into account” the Paris 
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Principles. The convention is, however, unusually detailed on state obligations related to 
implementation activities, also reflected in the embedding of the focal point and coordination 
mechanism within government itself.14  
In effect, the CRPD and OPCAT establish a complex RIT system to strengthen 
monitoring and implementation of treaty obligations. The success or failure of these 
instruments is likely to hinge on the robustness of triangulation between the international and 
domestic level, with intermediary performance of central concern. It is also important to 
acknowledge the role of informal intermediaries across both regimes, in particular other UN 
agencies and civil society organizations. International and domestic NGOs, such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, European Disability Forum, International Disability 
Council, and Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT), play prominent roles in the 
development of rules, information-gathering, and advice and support to diverse regulatory 
actors, including those intermediaries established by the two instruments. Such support will 
continue to be vital. Formal rules are insufficient to guarantee the independence or effective 
function of these actors, especially in settings where targets are strongly motivated to resist 
implementation. To the greatest extent possible, diverse intermediaries should seek to 
strengthen the regulatory system through regulatory stewardship. 
 
What Is Regulatory Stewardship? 
Regulatory stewardship can be defined as the assignment of mutual-monitoring and support 
responsibilities among intermediaries themselves, with the goal of safeguarding against capture 
and enhancing performance. The focus is on the role of the intermediary in respect to other 
intermediaries, so stewardship may occur in any regulatory system with multiple 
intermediaries. Stewardship addresses a central concern: the performance of intermediaries and 
their influence on regulatory interactions. Given that intermediaries are vulnerable to capture 
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and may expand opportunities for capture, intermediaries should also engage in monitoring one 
another. Multiple intermediaries enable this stewardship function, quite apart from the other 
structural benefits of RIT systems that Abbott, Levi-Faur, and Snidal (this volume) identify. 
Stewards may monitor intermediary form and function against established rules, provide 
support and assistance to bring performance into line, and deter capture through positive 
incentives and negative sanctions, such as adverse publicity. 
In principle, any intermediary can act as a regulatory steward. As shown in Figure 2, 
stewardship focuses on the intermediary acting on behalf of the regulator, but in conjunction 
with other intermediaries. Stewardship may operate vertically across levels of governance 
and/or horizontally within a particular jurisdiction, with bidirectional flows of influence 
between intermediaries. It mirrors the extension that Havinga and Verbruggen (this volume) 
developed, in which multiple intermediaries operate in parallel to one another, yet still between 
the regulator and target. Stewardship is therefore a nonlinear arena of intermediation, operating 
in parallel to regulatory chains within the regime. It does not only involve intermediaries inter 
se; stewards can also monitor the regulator to make sure it is not captured.  
 
FIGURE 2 
Regulatory Stewardship within an RIT Arrangement 
 
 
 
 
 
Diverse goals may make particular intermediaries more or less suitable as stewards in 
different settings. For example, government agencies may be encouraged to develop 
Intermediary 
Regulator Target 
Intermediary 
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professional norms of stewardship and often possess the advantage of executive authority. 
However, they will typically require special supervision to avoid conflicts of interest given 
their proximity to the target. This qualification applies to any intermediary that is the recipient 
of significant resources from the target. 
Regulatory stewardship can be formal and an actor’s core function, but it can also be 
informal and one of many roles that an actor plays, alongside rule-developer, monitor, or 
facilitator or enforcer of target compliance. Stewards may be created by the regulator (or other 
actors) through rules that require mutual monitoring and support among intermediaries (De 
Silva, this volume). Alternatively, an authorizing actor may adopt enabling rules, such as 
guarantees of direct access among intermediaries, knowing that these will empower 
intermediaries to engage in stewardship activities. Or stewardship may be a policy pursued by 
an intermediary without any formal authorization. Where multiple intermediaries do not exist, 
a single intermediary may encourage the regulator or other actors to create a suitable structure 
to establish a stewardship arrangement. 
Working under a formal mandate is likely to magnify the impact of a steward, and to 
elicit cooperation from other intermediaries. However, acceptance of a steward’s role by other 
stakeholders may be sufficient for this innovation to take hold, potentially triggering emulation 
of stewardship practices more widely. Regardless of whether stewardship is formally regulated 
or informal, the intermediary should take responsibility for the integrity of the entire regulatory 
system, to the extent that it can. An intermediary might be a more effective steward if it has 
express authorization, but all intermediaries should be expected to undertake this task, using 
whatever authority they possess. Given that some intermediaries may have their own goals and 
be reluctant to assume this function, whoever creates them should consider mandating the 
stewardship function, as well as providing potential stewards with the appropriate authority. 
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Stewards may use both hierarchical and managerial techniques to monitor and support 
other intermediaries. As developed further below, their choice will depend in part on the task 
environments that they encounter. Two strands of explanation, managerial and instrumental, 
can be identified in the scholarship on compliance. Prominent managerial accounts argue for 
noncoercive strategies to support targets that genuinely wish to comply but find that they 
cannot (Chayes and Chayes 1993). Conversely, instrumental explanations highlight 
compliance problems inherent to regulatory contexts defined by strong distributive and value 
conflicts, above all resistance by the target to implementation (Posner 2010). Such adverse 
settings will require harder enforcement mechanisms. Applying these two logics to 
stewardship, intermediaries operating in contested regulatory terrain may be particularly 
vulnerable to capture and/or under-performance, requiring stewards to employ harder 
hierarchical techniques to steer behavior. Conversely, where intermediaries operate in 
relatively cooperative regulatory settings, but find that they cannot fulfill their functions due to 
low capacity or insufficient authority, stewards may adopt a mutual-support approach. 
Mutual monitoring is the primary task of the steward, through police patrol or watchdog 
procedures, supervision and even sanctions. Stewards typically focus on monitoring other 
intermediaries’ mandates, independence, capacity, routines, and operating procedures as they 
develop over time. However, stewardship can also be extended to monitoring the creation of 
intermediaries yet to be established, whether the creator is a target, beneficiary, regulator, or 
any other actor with a view to facilitate subsequent stewardship activities. The second aspect 
of stewardship is mutual support. Managerial stewardship might involve promoting voluntary 
adherence through training, technical assistance, fostering dialogue, and capacity-building. 
Where an intermediary is structured appropriately and undertaking significant efforts to fulfill 
its function—even if falling short of optimal performance—stewards can support and assist it 
so as to make the overall regulatory system stronger. The hierarchical and managerial logics of 
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action are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, they may be complementary. Astute stewardship 
will require deploying a mix of regulatory instruments, responsive to changing circumstances 
and managing relationships on which the long-term success of the regime depends. 
The techniques a steward employs to influence an intermediary also depend on the 
powers that it is granted. In turn, a steward might have higher capacity to influence some 
intermediaries more than others. For example, stewards may establish transnational networks, 
and even accreditation systems, to promote a stewardship system among peer agencies. 
Capacity is likely to be a function of enabling rules including mandates, direct access to other 
intermediaries, expertise and organizational resources, and legitimacy. Regulatory stewardship 
does not make any assumptions regarding intermediary capacities to advance its goals. 
Lobbying skills may provide an important additional resource. 
The CRPD and OPCAT provide fertile terrain to explore the application of regulatory 
stewardship. The formal and informal linkages among intermediaries map relatively 
straightforwardly onto this conceptual framework, allowing us to investigate the important 
questions of how, and under what conditions, effective regulatory stewardship can become 
institutionalized in practice. We turn now to the experience under these instruments. For 
reasons of space, I focus on the international intermediaries expressly established by the two 
instruments vis-à-vis formal domestic intermediaries. The analysis is guided by the three 
factors identified as impacting effective stewardship: (1) the characteristics of the task 
environment, in particular the extent to which the target is motivated to resist implementation; 
(2) the enabling quality of formal rules, especially the extent to which they provide 
intermediaries (as potential stewards) independence safeguards, mutual-monitoring, and 
support prerogatives; and (3) the policy approaches potential stewards apply in practice. 
 
Drawing Out the Contrast: Human Rights as Regulatory Task Environments 
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Task environment has important implications for effective regulatory stewardship. 
Intermediaries operating in regulatory settings where the target is motivated to resist 
implementation may be subject to strong incentives to modify their own practices to benefit 
the target (T captures I) or otherwise be rendered ineffectual (T immobilizes I). Conversely, 
even in settings where the target genuinely wishes to comply, an intermediary may find that 
low capacity or insufficient administrative authority undermines its performance. As such, the 
compliance problem varies depending on the goal alignment between the regulator and the 
target, the degree to which the target exercises influence over the intermediary, and the capacity 
of intermediaries to discharge their function. Stewards seeking to influence other 
intermediaries should be attentive to this underlying task environment and tailor their use of 
hierarchical and managerial strategies accordingly. 
Human rights governance presents a particularly challenging task environment for 
achieving policy implementation. The prominent role of states in rule-making and rule 
enforcement reflects a fundamental paradox in the human rights enterprise: “principal moral 
hazard” (Miller 2005). Whereas principal-agent theory is preoccupied with negative behavior 
on the part of the agent (shirking or slacking), principal moral hazard focuses attention on how 
the conflicting interests of authorizing actors pose a threat to the independent and effective 
conduct of the agent. Observers note persistent violating behavior as indicative of systemic 
flaws that leave “false positives” unaccountable—individual states that commit to UN treaties 
without sincere intent to comply (Simmons 2009). However, as Dai (2015, 164) observes, 
“what matters is not the issue-area, but the strategic environment underlying a particular 
problem.” Notably, such variation differentiates disability rights from torture prevention. 
In general terms, the disability rights environment is more one of cooperation than of 
compliance (Chayes and Chayes 1993). A cooperative task environment underpins de Búrca’s 
(2015) modeling of the CRPD as emblematic of experimentalist human rights governance. The 
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unprecedented speed of negotiation and ratification of the instrument also aligns with a logic 
of cooperation.15 The CPRD seeks to benefit vulnerable groups that already enjoy significant 
legal protections, is generally situated in low visibility (and low status) policy domains such as 
social welfare, and often implicates the state in violations resulting from omission or neglect, 
as opposed to criminal or egregious actions.  
One implication of a cooperative regulatory setting is that the hierarchical stewardship 
imperative recedes and more weight is placed on the secondary task: mutual support. A 
managerial logic is implicit in the embedding of the CRPD focal point and coordination 
mechanism within government, directed to coordinate activities across government and 
facilitate cooperative solutions. As one CRPD expert puts it: “States know what’s wrong, they 
need solutions, they need people to actually contrive blueprints for change.”16 However, the 
task of monitoring remains important, particularly given the proximity of intermediaries to the 
target, coupled with resistance to ambitious elements of the CRPD that call for major social 
reform and budget allocations. Recent government pushback against controversial opinions of 
the CRPD committee is indicative of such resistance.17 Monitoring the NMM to ensure it is 
effectively monitoring these processes therefore remains a pressing concern. 
In contrast to the CRPD, the OPCAT is more a realm of compliance than of cooperation 
(Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996). Torture prevention typically does not involve a 
collective-action problem or material benefits to government. Unlike the CRPD’s open-ended 
revisability, the general obligation contained in the Convention Against Torture (CAT) is 
absolute. The OPCAT negotiations were not open to nonstate stakeholders, and intermediary 
form and function were the subjects of heated disagreements.18 Fourteen years since adoption, 
OPCAT has only eighty state parties and eighteen signatories. OPCAT seeks to protect 
beneficiaries often labeled as “undeserving,” which intrudes into core domains such as 
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security, and may implicate state officials in egregious, sometimes criminal, behavior (Holmes 
2013). Expert observers draw out the contrast: 
 
Everybody wants to be seen to be promoting the rights of persons with 
disabilities. It’s a sort of good cause everyone can get behind; you’re a 
good champion, whereas nobody wants to be seen to be fighting torture, 
because by doing so you admit that torture exists. In that equation, there is 
the recognition that we have a problem with torture. Nobody wants to 
admit to having that problem, and that’s where the difficulty lies.19 
 
The narrow regulatory objective of OPCAT, to gain effective access to all places of detention, 
also provokes strong sovereignty concerns. The Australian Parliament declared in 2009 that 
there was “no immediate need” for Australia to ratify the OPCAT, objecting to the fact that the 
instrument would constitute a standing invitation to the SPT.20 
Hard-nosed monitoring by regulatory stewards in this domain, including police patrol, 
watchdog procedures, and supervision, is likely to be necessary to guard against intermediary 
capture and poor performance. OPCAT practitioners are keen to contrast the protocol’s 
preventive paradigm (identifying risk factors and then making recommendations) with an 
accountability paradigm (holding people to account). Scope does exist for more managerial 
strategies of influence. However, practitioners also concede that “challenging [government 
officials] and holding them to account is high risk.”21 In adverse regulatory settings, express 
authorizations or enabling rules are likely to provide an important resource for empowering 
potential stewards. 
 
Regulatory Stewardship by Design 
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A regulator (or other actor) may install a regulatory stewardship arrangement through rules that 
require mutual monitoring and support among intermediaries. Alternatively, an authorizing 
actor may adopt enabling rules, or an intermediary may pursue a stewardship policy without 
any formal authorization. Neither the CRPD nor OPCAT expressly authorizes the SPT and 
CRPD committee to undertake regulatory stewardship. However, both instruments contain, to 
varying degrees, rules that can enable stewardship in practice. These include rules related to 
mandate, access, expertise, organizational autonomy, and independence.  
A stewardship function is most clearly imprinted in the design of the SPT. Mutual 
monitoring prerogatives can be inferred from the SPT mandate to undertake three core tasks: 
(1) conduct country visits in places of deprivation of liberty, (2) coordinate the work of NPMs, 
and (3) cooperate with other UN and regional organizations. This triadic function provides a 
robust basis for elaborating a stewardship role. However, the overarching mission of the SPT 
remains coordination of a global inspection system of detention facilities. 
Notably, the SPT is also granted an express mandate to advise on NPM establishment. 
The subcommittee is further directed to maintain direct (and, if necessary, confidential) contact 
with NPMs. Governments are also obliged to guarantee NPMs direct access to the SPT. On the 
secondary task of mutual support, the SPT is instructed to offer training and technical assistance 
to enhance NPM capacity, and to advise and assist on protection activities. The OPCAT also 
provides for a fund to support SPT capacity-building of NPMs.22 OPCAT rules regarding SPT-
NPM engagement are supplemented by the SPT’s “rules of procedure,” which it establishes 
itself.23 
In the event of noncooperation by the target or intermediary, the SPT can deploy a 
limited range of formal sanctions, which include releasing critical preliminary findings and 
making public statements.24 Finally, while SPT independence safeguards are more robust than 
other treaty bodies, SPT members are not subject to any external form of accountability, 
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beyond periodic reelection. The OPCAT sets down detailed independence, impartiality, and 
expertise criteria for committee membership.25 However, there is no prohibition on SPT 
members working for governments simultaneously. Stewardship activities by other 
intermediaries, including NPMs and civil society organizations, are important to ensure that 
these independence shortcomings do not jeopardize the legitimacy of the SPT.26 
The CRPD displays a less-enabling stewardship framework, especially in terms of 
monitoring prerogatives. It has no provision for a subcommittee, with legal interpretation and 
monitoring duties entrusted to a Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
Following the traditional treaty body paradigm, the committee is restricted to an indirect form 
of watchdog oversight. Committee discretion to engage independent monitors can be inferred 
from the reporting obligations of state parties. Another point of interaction may come under 
the convention’s optional protocol, which includes an individual complaints procedure and 
provision for country visits (with state-party consent).27  
The CRPD committee is not guaranteed direct access to national mechanisms. 
However, neither is it proscribed from engaging with them as a matter of institutional practice, 
and importantly, like the SPT, it can “establish its own rules of procedure.”28 Article 37 
provides a general directive that the committee “give due consideration to ways and means of 
enhancing national capacities,” which provides scope for elaborating a stewardship function. 
Interestingly, Article 16 (protection of disabled persons in places of detention) offers a point 
of intersection with the OPCAT, opening up the possibility of regulatory stewardship across 
the two regimes. Committee prerogatives in the event of noncooperation are not addressed in 
the convention. In terms of independence, the convention shares similar deficits and is less 
exacting than the OPCAT. The committee comprises up to eighteen members, who serve in 
their personal capacity and must be “competent, experienced and possess high moral 
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standing.”29 No independence or impartiality criteria are provided. Requisite expertise is also 
nonspecific.  
In effect, the CRPD provides less scope for the subcommittee to exercise a fully fledged 
regulatory stewardship function. Nevertheless, the convention does provide some limited scope 
for it to pursue a policy of stewardship. As the next section elaborates, compliance problems 
have provided a motive for the committee to (reluctantly) assume a regulatory stewardship role. 
 
Regulatory Stewardship in Practice 
Rules are not self-activating. Their scope of application hinges in large part on motivated actors 
invoking them as a basis for action. Regulatory stewardship is not expressly authorized in either 
the OPCAT or CRPD. However, the SPT and CRPD committee operate under a range of 
enabling rules that make stewardship a viable policy option. This section surveys policies 
adopted by both bodies in practice, with attention to the primary task of mutual monitoring, 
monitoring the creation of intermediaries, and the secondary component of mutual support. 
 
OPCAT regulatory stewardship 
Although the work of the SPT is conducted in a “spirit of cooperation,” the SPT has 
recognized that unless “the NPM are able to fulfil their role … the work of the [s]ubcommittee 
will be seriously limited and adversely affected.”30 Monitoring of NPMs has emerged as a 
priority. Observers urged the subcommittee to “step up to the challenge of establishing itself 
as a central player in OPCAT” or “risk losing credibility” (Murray et al. 2011, 176). The SPT 
responded by placing oversight of NPM at the center of its strategy, with particular attention 
to monitoring NPM’s operation and functioning. The SPT issued detailed guidelines on NPM 
form and function in 2010.31 SPT country visits have provided an important focal point for 
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monitoring activities. The SPT introduced the innovative category of “NPM advisory visit” in 
2012. A total of fifty-two visits have been undertaken as of August 2016. 
Although visits are typically framed in terms of advice and assistance to NPMs, they 
also provide opportunities to police intermediary independence. This has led the subcommittee 
to issue critical statements on NPM independence, addressing issues of NPM membership,32 
the lack of civil society participation,33 inappropriate placement of NPMs within state 
structures,34 and budget allocations compromising the autonomy of the office.35 The SPT has 
engaged state officials directly to strengthen NPM independence.36 As one expert puts it, the 
SPT “is like an international cousin to the national mechanisms, [they] can protect them with 
a more extended field of influence and prestige in the UN.” 37 They also typically encourage 
NPMs themselves to “take steps to back up the efforts made on [their] behalf by the 
[s]ubcommittee.”38 NPMs must also follow up on SPT visit reports, with delays in doing so 
monitored by the subcommittee.39 
The capacity of the SPT to engage in NPM monitoring is in part a function of resources, 
which is a constant source of concern. However, it also has much to do with an enabling rule 
framework. As the SPT chair puts it: 
 
The power of a legal mandate is more than some people think, we have 
been able to do things which they [state parties] absolutely don’t want us 
to do, but then they can see that we mean business and that we’ve got the 
legal mandate on our side.40 
 
Country visits, coupled with guarantees of direct and confidential contact with NPMs, 
give the SPT a significant informational advantage in independently assessing NPM 
performance. The subcommittee has not shied away from criticizing NPMs that are manifestly 
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failing in their duties.41 Although the SPT is unable to compel intermediaries, it can issue 
formal public statements and can utilize “all possible good offices within the United Nations 
system and any other appropriate forums.”42 It has used publicity and press statements to 
criticize governments where political support for NPM is lacking.43 
SPT stewardship activities have also been extended to monitoring the creation of 
intermediaries yet to be established. Experts note that “the space between ratification and NPM 
designation must be monitored very closely by everyone.”44 The SPT website hosts information 
on established NPMs and pending designations.45 Of seventy-nine state parties that have 
ratified the OPCAT, fifty-five have designated an NPM. In the face of official resistance, the 
SPT has successfully requested access to drafts of NPM legislation.46 The SPT has not been 
shy in challenging state parties that fail to abide by NPM design safeguards.47 The SPT may 
also work with existing domestic agencies. In Peru, a robustly independent NHRI was 
designated the NPM in December 2015, nine years after OPCAT ratification and in the face of 
significant government hostility.48 In this case, sustained NGO and NHRI advocacy, coupled 
with an SPT country visit in 2013, were important. Such episodes indicate the compliance 
problems that plague this domain. 
In assessing NPM form, the SPT endorses the Paris Principles, which provide a standard 
on which to assess NHRI design conformity. The peer-network Global Alliance of NHRIs 
(GANHRI) undertakes a letter-grade accreditation system (“A” status indicating full 
compliance) within the UN system.49 However, the principles have some drawbacks, which 
have led the SPT to resist deferral to GANHRI accreditation. First, as Reif (2015) points out, 
accreditation may exclude independent institutions that effectively protect human rights, but 
do not comply with all aspects of the principles. Second, it risks reducing assessment of NPMs 
to a tick box exercise. The subcommittee has stated that the formal suitability of a NHRI for 
the NPM role must be assessed on a country-by-country basis.50  
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SPT experts are even more wary of using the GANHRI letter grade system for a purpose 
for which it was not intended: monitoring NPM performance. This reflects a distinct approach 
toward the mutual support aspect of regulatory stewardship. The SPT does regularly employ 
managerial strategies to influence NPM performance. In the words of the SPT chair: 
 
If it turns out that they’re [the NPM] not independent or they’re not 
functioning as they ought, then rather than just label them as bad or not 
very good, our role is to talk to the NPM, to understand its practice, find 
out what the problems are, and try to get it to work better.51 
 
Geneva-based engagement with NPMs is important in this respect, including informal 
dialogues, exchange of information, and regular meetings under the aegis of the OPCAT 
contact group. This also allows NPMs to exercise mutual regulatory stewardship. Notably, 
some members of the SPT are former NPM functionaries. However, particular emphasis is 
placed on advice, assistance, and training to NPMs in the field. SPT visits often involve joint 
missions to places of detention, training, and capacity-building. These activities typically result 
in corrective strategic advice.52 The subcommittee also regularly advises NPMs on questions 
of law and its adaptation to local conditions.53 
 
CRPD regulatory stewardship 
Although the CRPD grants the committee some stewardship prerogatives, since 
becoming operational in 2010 the committee has made minimal efforts to pursue such a policy 
in practice. Activities have focused on defining CRPD legal scope, rather than monitoring 
compliance with Article 33 (national implementation and monitoring). Observers attribute this 
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omission to a range of factors, including resource constraints, mandate-overload, and 
individual preferences of committee members. 
The committee’s activieis have focused almost exclusively on the independent NMM, 
as opposed to the focal point or coordination mechanism. Official guidelines on the form and 
function of NMMs were issued (in draft form) in June 2016,54 but no guidelines have been 
issued with respect to the two governmental intermediaries. Although “committee working 
methods” provide for the committee to designate focal points to foster interaction with these 
entities, none have been established. Many of the committee’s concluding observations omit 
references to the focal point or coordination mechanism.55 In more recent observations, the 
committee has generally lamented the lack of designation of such bodies.56 Exceptions include 
observations on Hong Kong (China), which express worry at “the low rank of the focal point.”57 
Observations on Slovakia refer briefly to the limited capacity of the focal points and 
coordination mechanism.58 
Given the emphasis of the CRPD on implementation and the committee’s inability to 
conduct field visits, the lack of rigorous monitoring of independence and performance of 
national intermediaries is perhaps surprising. However, underlying this deficit is the difficulty 
the committee confronts in obtaining access to information, given its reliance on third parties 
and its lack of visitation powers. As one observer notes, given these limitations, “it is easier to 
make recommendations when there is no structure or when you know that the structure is 
governmental.”59 This is reflected in various concluding observations. For example, the 
committee notes that the so-called Independent Monitoring Committee in Austria “appears to 
lacks the independence required.”60 Similarly, concluding observations on Serbia express 
concern about the lack of information on the composition of the NMM.61  
This informational disadvantage has also impeded the committee’s ability to undertake 
monitoring of intermediary performance. CRPD experts underscore the importance of “a strong 
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independent analogue to the implementation role of government” (Quinn 2008). In its NMM 
guidelines, the committee calls on states to “refrain from directly or indirectly restricting, 
limiting or interfering with monitoring activities.”62 But the committee has been reluctant to 
address NMM performance in its concluding observations. This has begun to change with 
recent reports on problem cases, including Mexico, Paraguay, and Uganda, where observations 
address issues of strategy, insufficient resources, participation of disability organizations, and 
independence.63 
The committee has no formal mandate to advise on intermediary establishment. 
However, a survey of designation outcomes in Europe suggests that the committee could make 
greater use of its reporting procedure to do so. Of thirty-two countries, twenty-one have 
designated their NMMs. Some of these mechanisms clearly do not comply, including Italy 
where the Minister of Labor and Social Policy chairs the independent mechanism.64 This is 
attributed largely to confusion among governments as to the obligations arising from Article 
33.65 In response, the committee has begun to advise on NMM creation. Notably, its 2015 
report on the Czech Republic is the first to explicitly recommend that a particular entity be 
designated as the NMM.66 However, observations on yet-to-be-established intermediaries are 
generally short, nonspecific and, in contrast to the SPT, reliant on the Paris Principles.  
The committee has also not taken advantage of its mandate to actively pursue a 
managerial policy of mutual support. In surveying best practice on UN treaty body engagement 
with national mechanisms, the committee conspicuously omits the SPT from its 2016 draft 
guidelines. Instead, interaction centers on Geneva-based modalities: NMM participation in the 
committee’s general reporting procedure, working group presessions, and dialogue between 
the committee and the state party. These modalities of treaty body engagement fall short of 
direct intermediary support. For many observers, an exclusively Geneva-based engagement 
policy is problematic. Distant from the realities of human rights violations, they argue that it is 
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also difficult for national mechanisms to justify the resource demands of international 
participation.  
The committee does have tools at its disposal to actively assist NMMs within local 
jurisdictions. The committee has recently acknowledged its “role as a capacity-building agent 
under article 37.”67 But it defers to NHRIs and NMMs for this function. The committee 
recognizes that CRPD implementation will require “collective, coordinated and continuous 
efforts” by diverse actors but is reluctant to take a lead on coordination itself.68 That said, the 
committee has recently stated its intention to explore the possibility of working more closely 
with national intermediaries on developing core indicators and supporting their activities.69 
This could lay the groundwork for more active regulatory stewardship in practice. 
 
Conclusion 
The RIT framework provides scholars an opportunity to examine regulatory regimes involving 
intermediation that highlight significant reform and bely prominent claims of gridlock (Hale, 
Held, and Young 2013). This study has illuminated a new generation of formalized 
intermediary-centered human rights treaty innovation that builds on longstanding efforts to 
orchestrate informal action through third parties (Pegram 2015). Separating out the 
intermediary from the rule-maker and the rule-taker is a necessary addition to accounts of an 
evolving UN system (de Búrca 2015), and highlights new intrusive channels for affecting the 
behavior of regulatory targets. 
The OPCAT and CRPD introduce a novel formalization of engagement between and 
among international and national intermediaries. The imprinting of national intermediary form 
and function within binding treaty law represents a paradigm shift in the human rights field. 
This article finds that the RIT model maps relatively straightforwardly onto these two 
instruments, with the crucial qualification that in this domain it is the target that appoints the 
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formal intermediaries. This, of course, introduces a high risk of capture and shows how the 
RIT framework can foreground intermediation as an alternative channel for regulatory capture. 
This study has advanced regulatory stewardship as a novel solution to this policy dilemma, 
especially where targets are strongly motivated to resist implementation. 
Focusing on the experience of international intermediaries established by these two 
instruments, the study has probed three factors posited as influencing effective regulatory 
stewardship: (1) the nature of the task environment; (2) the enabling quality of rule 
frameworks; and (3) the approaches adopted by potential stewards in practice. The findings 
here support this three-fold explanation, with SPT policy entrepreneurs drawing on a more 
robust enabling rule framework to exercise effective regulatory stewardship in practice, despite 
confronting an adverse task environment.  
Additional factors also emerge as central to the study; in particular, access assumes 
particular significance. The SPT scores highly on this dimension. Its ability to access local 
jurisdictions without state party consent, combined with guaranteed access to national 
intermediaries, has proven to be a significant resource. More broadly, the study suggests that 
in-country supervision by independent international monitors, alongside domestic peers, is 
important. It offers a superior arrangement to the remote watchdog oversight exercised by other 
treaty bodies, and to ideas of subsidiarity, whereby international actors may only intervene 
when national mechanisms are not established or manifestly not functional.  
These findings provide a robust premise for further analysis of RIT regulation in 
multilevel governance settings, as well as more careful, contextual analysis of those factors 
that may enable or impede regulatory success and failure, including capture. Regulatory 
stewardship provides additional insight into an internal, dynamic realm of RIT intermediation, 
one that may become institutionalized as policy. Further study could illuminate the 
opportunities and constraints that regulatory stewardship presents for a wide array of formal 
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and informal regulatory intermediaries, for example, probing power asymmetries among 
stewards and the potential for relations to shift (from mutual reinforcement to co-dependency, 
for example). 
The challenge of compliance within multilevel governance settings is central to this 
study. The RIT model is emblematic of efforts by regulatory scholars to innovate coherent and 
realistic alternatives to old governance orthodoxies. Regulatory stewardship reflects this 
scholarly and real-world imperative, identifying an additional benefit to be derived from RIT 
regulation. It represents an adaptive response by motivated actors (both regulators and others) 
to the risk of regulatory failure. It highlights the latent power of enabling rules, providing new 
arenas for experimentation in the shadow of interstate hierarchy. Above all, it exemplifies 
efforts to connect global regulatory arrangements to the realities of the violation. As both 
CRPD and OPCAT experts agree: “no violation is ever addressed in Geneva. It always … 
depends on what happens when you go back home.”70 
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